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We study the general problem of a principal who desires to implement a given vector of 
actions and pay the agents according to a given compensation scheme. Previous work has 
provided mechanisms for implementation in various special cases. In this paper we fully 
characterize the set of action profiles and compensation schemes implement able in subgame 
perfect equilibrium, providing necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation. 
1 Introduction 
In the traditional implementation problem with complete information there is a set of possible 
states of the world S, with typical element s, a set of possible decisions D and a social choice 
function (or correspondence) f : S -t D that the planner wants to implement. The state of 
the world s is observed by N agents, who have utilities defined over S x D, but not by the 
planner. The problem is therefore to set up a mechanism making sure that the agents report 
truthfully the state of the world they observe. The presence of complete information makes 
incentive considerations trivial, since no agent has truly private information. It is therefore 
easy to set up a mechanism delivering truthtelling as an equilibrium (in fact, by the revelation 
principle the direct mechanism suffices). The difficult part is to make sure that truthtelling 
is the unique equilibrium, or more precisely to make sure that f (8) is the unique equilibrium 
outcome when the state of the world is s. 
'Vhether or not is actually possible to design a mechanism delivering unique implemen-
tation depends on the properties of f and on the equilibrium notion adopted to predict the 
outcome of the mechanism. The literature has provided complete characterizations of the 
set of implementable social choice functions for an array of solution concepts, such as Nash 
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equilibrium (Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen (1991)), subgame perfect equilib-
rium (Moore and Repullo (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1990)) and virtual implementation with 
iterative elimination of dominated strategies (Abreu and Matsushima (1992)). 
The traditional problem described above can be seen as an 'adverse selection', or 'hidden 
information' problem. In this paper we look at the 'moral hazard' or 'hidden action' counter-
part. The problem can be described 8..<; follows. Let I be a finite set of agents. Each agent i 
can take an action ai in the finite set A. Let A = x iEI Ai with typical element a = (ab' .. , a I)' 
and A-i = XjEI\iAj with typical element a-i = (al, ... ,ai-l,ai+l, ... aI). The action profile 
a determines a probability distribution over some real-valued variable (the typical example is 
the revenue of a firm) v. Let V a be the finite set of values which can be taken by v when the 
true action profile is a, and let P ('Ia) be the probability distribution of v when the true action 
profile is a. Define V = UaEA V a . 
An individual compensation scheme for agent i is a function Wi : V - R, i.e. Wi specifies 
a monetary transfer for each possible realization of v. A compensation scheme W is just a col-
lection of individual compensation schemes, i.e. W = (Wl, ... , W I)' Each agent has preferences 
over actions and individual compensation schemes represented by a utility function of the form: 
Ui(a, Wi) = L p(vla)ui[a, Wi(V)] 
vEV 
where the "basic" utility function u i : A x R - R, is defined over the whole action profile a 
and the monetary transfer, and the probability distribution p(.) is common to all players. 
The goal of the planner is to make sme that each agent takes a given action ai, so that the 
action profile a* = (ai, . .. ,aj) is collecti\'ely taken, and reward each agent with compensation 
scheme wi when a* is the true action profile. Defining w* = (wi, ... , wj), we will refer to 
this as 'the problem of implementing the pair (a*,w*)'. A well known example is the case of 
a risk neutral employer with risk averse agents who desires to implement the action profile a* 
maximizing expected revenue and pay a constant wage to each agentl (i.e. for each i there is 
a real number Wi such that wi (v) = Wi for each v). 
The 'complete information' assumption in this model takes the form that each agent can 
observe the whole action profile a. This again eliminates incentive considerations, since an 
agent can be forced to take ai simply because any different action could be reported to the 
principal, and a stiff fine could follow. It leaves however open the multiplicity problem. 
Such a problem was first considered by Demski and Sappington (1984) and Mookherjee 
(1984). They observed that standard 'tournament' models usually have multiple equilibria, and 
some of the 'bad' equilibria may be Pareto-superior from agents' point of view. In particular, 
in 'direct revelation' types of mechanisms it is often an equilibrium for all the agents to take the 
lowest level of effort and report unanimously that the required effort was actually undertaken. 
Ma, Moore and Thrnbull (1988) have shown how to get unique implementation in the Demski-
Sappington model, and Ma (1988) has shown that unique implementation in subgame perfect 
equilibrium is achievable in the MOQkherjee model. A number of recent contributions, among 
them Arya and Glover (1995), Sjostrom (1996), Arya, Glover and Hughes (1997) and Brusco 
ISee Ma (1988) for an analysis of this case. 
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(1997) have all proposed mechanism for implementation in some variant of the general model. 
The main goal of these papers is to provide mechanisms to solve a given implementation 
problem. Obviously, the simpler the mechanism the better it is. In other words, the above 
cited papers only look at sufficient conditions for implementation. 
In this paper we take a different perspective, which is more related to the classical imple-
mentation perspective. The question we want to answer is: Can we identify necessary and 
sufficient conditions that a pair (a*, w*) has to satisfy in order to be implementable? We con-
sider subgame perfect equilibrium as the solution concept, and provide such conditions. Since 
the goal is only to provide a full characterization of implementable pairs (a*, w*), identifying 
exactly the class of implement able pairs, we do not try to use simple mechanisms in our proof. 
While the mechanism adopted for the general proof is complicated and incorporates the unde-
sirable 'integer game' feature, it is clear that in many (not so special) cases simpler mechanism 
are available, as shown by the papers cited above. 
The rest of the paper is organized a<; follows. In section 2 we provide a discussion of the 
problem of implementing action profiles and state the result about necessary conditions. In 
section 3 we show that, when there are at least three agents, the necessary conditions are also 
sufficient, and describe a general mechanism for implementation. Section 4 contains concluding 
remarks. The proofs are collected in the appendix. 
2 Necessary Conditions 
There are two main differences between the traditional implementation problem and the prob-
lem of implementing action profiles. First, agents will report on an endogenous variable (the 
action profile) rather than on some exogenously given state of the world. 
Second, 'action taking' is given by some technological process and it cannot be manipulated 
by the principal. This imposes some physiological constraints on the form that the mechanism 
can take. In particular, any extensive game which is adopted to implement the pair (a*, w*) 
must be made up of 3 parts: 
1. A 'pre-action part', where agents send messages. This has to be intended as an extensive 
form at which messages are exchanged, with the final vector of messages observed by the 
principal and the agents. Depending on the message profile, either the game ends and 
payments are determined, or the game proceeds to the action stage. 
2. An 'action part' where each agent chooses an action, possibly as a function of the outcome 
of the pre-action stage. Simultaneously, the agent can also issue some message2• The set 
of messages available to the agents may depend on the message profile announced at the 
pre-action stage. The action profile is observed by the agents but not by the principal, 
while the message profile issued at this stage is also observed by the principal. 
2Here 'simultaneously' should be interpFeted with respect to the information structure, that is messages are 
sent before actions are observed and actions are taken before messages are observed. 
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3. A 'post-action part' where messages are again issued. The particular extensive form 
used may depend on the messages sent at the pre-action stage and at the action stage. 
However, it cannot depend on the action profile a, since this is not observable by the 
principal. 
The final vector of messages (i.e. messages issued at each stage) determines the compensation 
scheme selected by the principal, while the action profile implemented is simply the one chosen 
by the agents at the action stage. 
The search for necessary conditions for implementation has to take into account this nat-
ural structure of any mechanism. In order to understand better what type of conditions we 
may need, it is useful to think about the necessary conditions in the 'standard' (Le., hidden 
information) implementation problem. The basic idea is that if the social choice function pre-
scribes two different allocations at state s and at state s' we want to avoid that the strategy 
profile adopted at s be an equilibrium when the state of the world is s'. When implementing 
action profiles, the main issue becomes to make sure that an action profile a =1= a* is not taken 
in equilibrium. In particular, we want to avoid equilibria in which a =1= a* is the action profile 
taken and the agents issue the same messages as in the equilibrium in which a* is taken, thus 
leading to the selection of the compensation scheme w*. In other words, whenever an action 
profile a =1= a* is going to be taken there must be a profitable deviation for some agent at some 
stage of the mechanism. As observed before, all mechanisms for implementation of action 
profiles can be partitioned in three parts, and we are going now to provide three conditions, 
each one corresponding to the case in which a profitable deviation can be found at a given 
part. 
First, we have a condition making possible a deviation in the post-action part. 
Condition 1 An action profile a satisfies Condition 1 with respect to a* if it is possible to find 
an agent j (a, a*) (shortly, j) and a pair of individual compensation schemes wj (a, a*) ,wJ (a, a*) 
(shortly, wj, wJ) such that: 
Condition 1 permits to 'test' independently a claim made by an agent that the true action 
profile is a rather than a*. This structure is used for example by Ma (1988). Brusco (1997) 
discusses the relationship between condition 1 and Abreu and Sen's condition et, a necessary 
condition for sub game perfect implementation in the 'adverse selection' framework. 
Second, we have the condition making possible a deviation at the action part. 
Condition 2 An action profile a satisfies Condition 2 with respect to (a*, w*) if it is possi-
ble to find an agent i(a,a*) (shortly, i), an action o'i(a,a*) (shortly, ai) and an individual 
compensation scheme wf (a, a*) (shortly, wf) such that: 
4 
2. If there exists an action ai such that Ui ((ai, a~i) ,wY) > Ui (a*, wi) then (ai, a~i) satis-
fies condition 1 with respect to (o'i, a-d· 
The condition makes sure that an agent can deviate from an action profile a f:. a* taking a 
different action o'i and possibly asking for a different compensation scheme (part 1). The same 
deviation cannot be profitable when the action profile is a* (part 2). 
Last, we have the condition making possible a deviation in the pre-action part. 
Condition 3 An action profile a satisfies Condition 3 with respect to (a*, w*) if there exists 
an agent i (a, a*) (shortly, i), an action profile a (a, a*) (shortly, a) and a compensation scheme 
wY (a, a*) (shortly, wY ) such that: 
1. Ui(a, wY) > Ui(a, wi) 
2. Ui(a,wY)::; Ui(a*,wi) 
3. If an action profile a is such that Ui(a, wY) ::; Ui(a, wi) then either a satisfies Condition 
1 with respect to a or a satisfies Condition 2 with respect to (a, wY). 
4. If there exists an action ai such that Ui ((ai, a-i) ,wY) > ui (a, wY) then (ai, a-i) satisfies 
condition 1 with respect to a. 
As we observed above, any mechanism must make sure that the message profile leading to the 
choice of w* is not an equilibrium when agents plan to take action profile a f:. a*. This means 
that any action profile a f:. a* must satisfy at least one of the conditions stated above. More 
formally, we have the following result. 
Theorem 1 If the pair (a*, w*) is implcmentable, then each action profile a =1= a* satisfies at 
least one of conditions 1-3. 
Proof. See Appendix .• 
The union of conditions 1-3 is therefore a necessary condition for implementation of a 
pair (a*, w*). The role played by such condition is therefore analogous to the role played by 
?vlaskin monotonicity for Nash implementation or by condition a (see Abreu and Sen (1990)) for 
sllbgame perfect implementation. To complete the analogy, we have to show that the condition 
is also sufficient when there are at least three agents. This is done in the next section. 
3 Sufficiency 
'Ve now show that when each action profile a =1= a* satisfies one of conditions 1,2 or 3 and there 
are at least three agents then we can actually implement the pair (a*, w*). 
This is done in the traditional way, building a mechanism having only the right outcome. In 
t he following we will assume for simplici ty that there is a sufficiently large amount of money K, 
and a sufficiently low amount -E, such that for each pair a, a we have Ui (a, K) > ui (a, Wi (v)) 
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and Ui (a, -E) < Ui (a,wi (v)) for each agent i, for each v and for each compensation scheme 
w entering in one of conditions 1-3. In other words, it is always possible to 'reward enough' 
and 'punish enough' an agent. 
Theorem 2 Suppose that each action profile a =I a* satisfies one of conditions 1, 2 or 3. 
If there are at least 3 agents then the pair (a*, w*) can be implemented in subgame perfect 
equilibrium. 
In the remainingofthis section we describe the mechanism for implementation. In the appendix 
we show that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium yielding (a*, w*) and that no subgame 
perfect equilibrium has an outcome other than (a*w*). 
Define Al as the set of action profiles that satisfy condition 1 with respect to a*, A2 the 
set of actions such that a (j. Al and Condition 2 is satisfied with respect to (a*,w*) , and A3 
the set of actions such that a (j. A I U A 2 and condition 3 is satisfied with respect to (a*, w*) . 
Since (a*, w*) is implementable, Al U A2 U A3 = A\a*. 
The pre-action stage 
Each agent announces an action profile a E A and an integer number. The outcome function 
is as follows. 
• N - 1 agents announce (a*, 0), agent i announces (a,·) . If a E A3 and i = i (a, a*) (Le. i 
is the agent identified by condition 3) then go to the action stage, defining (a, wY ) as the 
'standing message', where a = a(o,a*) is the action profile identified by condition 3 and 
wY = wY (a, a*) is the compensation scheme identified by condition 3. Otherwise, go to 
the action stage, defining (a*, w*) as the 'standing message'. 
• In all other cases the agent announcing the highest integer receives a large sum K , all 
other agents receive -E and the game ends. Ties are broken in favor of the lower index 
(this tie-breaking rule is used in all the following stages). 
The action stage 
Let (a, w) be the standing message. Each agent i takes an action and announces an action 
profile a E A and an integer number. The outcome function is as follows: 
• N -1 agents announce (a, 0), the remaining agent announces (a,·) . Go to the post-action 
stage with the standing message unchanged. 
• N - 1 agents announce (a,O), agent i announces (a,.). Go to the post-action stage 
defining the standing message as follows: 
- Suppose that a satisfies condition 2 with respect to (a, w) and i = i (a, a), i.e. i is the 
agent identified by the condition. In this case let ai = ai (a, a) and wy = wy (a, a) 
be the action and the individual compensation scheme identified by the condition. 
The standing message becomes ((ai, a-i), (wy, w-d). 
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- Otherwise the standing message remains (a, w) . 
• In all other cases the agent announcing the highest integer receives a large sum K , all 
other agents receive -E and the game ends. 
The post-action stage 
Each agent announces a E A and an integer number. The outcome function differs depending 
on the standing message. 
Case 1. The standing message is (a*, w*) . 
• N - 1 agents announce (a,O) , the remaining agent i announces (a,·) such that either a 
does not satisfy condition 1 with respect to a or i = j (a, a), i.e. i is the agent identified 
by the condition. In this case: 
- If a = a* then pay the agents according to w*. 
- If a =I- a* then all agents are paid -~E except the agent who announced the highest 
integer at the action stage, who is paid -E. 
• N - 1 agents announce (a,O) , the remaining agent i announces (a,·) that satisfies con-
dition 1 with respect to a and sllch that i =I- j Ca, a). In this case go to the substage 
r (a, a). 
• In all other cases the agent announcing the highest integer receives a large sum K , all 
other agents receive -E and the game ends 
Case 2. The standing message is Ca, w) -=1= (a*, w*). 
• N - 1 agents announce (a, 0) , the remaining agent i announces (a, -) such that either a 
does not satisfy condition 1 with respect to a or i = j (a, a). In this case: 
- If a does not satisfy condition 1 with respect to a then pay the agents according to 
w (here a and ware given by the standing message). 
- If a satisfies condition 1 with respect to a then all agents are paid -~E except the 
agent who announced the highest integer at the action stage, who is paid -E. 
• N - 1 agents announce (a, 0), the remaining agent i announces (a, .) that satisfies con-
dition 1 with respect to a and such that i =I- j (a, a). In this case go to the substage 
r (a, a). 
• In all other cases the agent annollncing the highest integer receives a large sum K, all 
other agents receive -E and th~ game ends. 
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The substage r (a, a). Let j be the agent and (wj, w}) the two compensation schemes identi-
fied by condition 1. Each agent announces either Y or N and an integer number. The outcome 
function is as follows. 
• If N -1 agents announce (Y,O) and agent j announces (Y,') then each agent is paid -2E 
and j is paid wj. 
• If N -1 agents announce (Y, 0) and agent j announces (N,·) then each agent is paid -2E 
and j is paid wJ. 
• If at least N - 1 agents announce (N,O) then agent i (the agent who 'disagreed' at the 
post-action stage)) is paid a large sum K and all other agents are paid -2E. 
• In all other cases the agent annollllcing the highest integer receives a large sum K , all 
other agents receive -2E and the game ends. Ties are broken in favor of the lower index. 
The basic idea of the mechanism is to make sure that in all equilibria the agents repeatedly 
confirm that the action profile a* is taken. The structure of the mechanism makes then sure 
that no action profile a =1= a* can be taken when such a sequence of messages is issued. This is 
done by exploiting conditions 1-3 to make sure that whenever a =1= a* is taken in equilibrium 
some agent has a profitable deviation at some point. 
4 Conclusion 
\Ve have provided necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementation of an action pro-
file a* and a vector of compensation schemes w*, thus obtaining a full characterization of the 
implementable pairs (a*, w*). This constitutes the natural counterpart of the necessary and 
sufficient condition for implementation in the traditional ('hidden information') implementa-
tion framework. The 'hidden action' case presents some interesting differences with respect 
to the tradition case. We have shown that mechanisms implementing action profiles have a 
natural sequential structure centered on the 'action taking' stage, and that necessary and suf-
ficient conditions can be obtained looking at some 'reversal of preferences' in different parts of 
the mechanism. Previous work has been more 'ad hoc' in the sense that special pairs (a*, w*) 
were considered and a mechanism for implementation was found. In general, these mechanism 
rely on some reversal of preferences at what we have called 'post-action stage'. We have shown 
that in fact implementation may be possible under more general conditions, involving reversal 
of preferences at the 'action stage' or at the 'pre-action stage'. 
Appendix 
Proof of theorem 1. 
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Suppose that there exists an extensive form mechanism implementing (a*, w*) in subgame 
perfect equilibrium. A formal description of an extensive form mechanism is beyond the scope 
of this paper, and we simply refer to Selten (1975). Here we will introduce only the notation 
which is helpful in understanding the proof. 
Let us define 9 as the outcome function of the extensive form game. Therefore, 9 maps each 
action profile and each sequence of messages observed into the same action profile and a vector 
of compensation schemes. We will denote by M the set of all possible sequences of messages 
that can be observed, Ml the set of possible sequences of messages that can be observed before 
the action stage, Ma the set of possible messages that can be observed at the action stage and 
M2 the set of possible sequences of messages that can be observed at the post-action stage. 
Thus 9 (a, m) = (a, w), with m EM. For a given action profile a and messages ml E Ml, 
ma E Ma we define M2 (ml' ma) as the set of message profiles observable at the post-action 
stage and 92 (m21 (ml' ma)) as the outcome function for this subgame. Notice that the outcome 
function is independent of a since this is not observable by the planner. However, a is observed 
by the players, so that they can condition their strategies on a. 
A strategy profile (Y describes the bcltavior taken by the agents at each information set. A 
given (Y yields a sequence of messages rn E M and an action profile. In turn, the sequence of 
messages yields through 9 a compensation scheme. 
Since the mechanism implements (a*, w*), there exists a strategy profile (Y* yielding this 
outcome. Let us call mi the vector of messages sent at the pre-action stage when agents follow 
(Y*. Since the strategy profile yields (a*, w*) we have that (Y* yields the pair (a*, m~) at the 
action stage (that is, following mi the action profile a* is taken and a message m~ is issued) 
and a message profile m2 at the post action stage when (mi, a*, m~) have been observed. 
Then 92 (m;1 (mi, m~)) = w*, that is when messages mi, m~ and m; are issued the selected 
compensation scheme is w*. 
Without loss of generality, assume that if at some subgame a unilateral deviation is observed 
then the worst possible subgame perfect equilibrium for the deviator is selected. 
Vve now show that if there is an action profile a f= a* that satisfies none of conditions 1,2 
and 3 then there exists a sub game perfect equilibrium yielding (a, w*), a contradiction. 
Consider such an action profile a and the following strategy profile: 
• At the pre-action stage each agent follows strategy (Yii. 
• If mi is observed after the pre-action stage then each agent takes action ai (rather than 
an and issues message m~i (that is, the same message as in the truthtelling equilibrium). 
In all other cases behave as in the original equilibrium. 
• At the post-action stage, use strategy (Y~ (mi, a* ,m~) if (mi, m~, a) has been observed. 
In all other cases, behave as in the original equilibrium. In other words, whenever all 
agents take the actions prescribed in action profile a and issue the message (mi, m~i) 
then behave as if the observed q,ction profile were a*. Otherwise, behave as in the original 
equilibrium. 
9 
This strategy profile results in the action profile a and a sequence of messages (mi, m~, m2) . 
Since this is the message observed in the 'right' equilibrium, the compensation scheme w* is 
selected. Therefore, the overall outcome is (a, w*) f= (a*, w*), and the strategy profile cannot 
be a subgame perfect equilibrium. We now prove that if a does not satisfy 1,2 or 3 then this 
is in fact a subgame perfect equilibrium, a contradiction. 
Suppose not. Then, at some subgame, a profitable deviation exists. Given the definition 
of the strategy profile we observe that: 
• no deviation is possible in subgames following ml f= mij 
• no deviation is possible in subgames following (mi, ma) if there is an agent i such that 
mi ...J. m i *. 
a ra' 
• no deviation is possible after observing an action profile a f= a. 
The reason is that in all those subgames exactly the original equilibrium strategy is followed. 
Deviations can therefore occur: 
1. At the post-action stage in some su bgame following (mi, m~, a) j 
2. At the action stage following a message mi. 
3. At the pre-action stage. 
Suppose first that the deviation occurs at a subgame following the sequence of messages 
and actions (mi, m~, a), and let us call j the agent with a profitable deviation. Suppose that 
by following strategy O"~ (mi, m~, a*) the outcome is WX (notice that the subgame need not be 
reached in equilibrium), and that a deviation by agent i yields a compensation scheme wY • 
Since the deviation is profitable we have Uj ( a, wJ) > uj (a, wj). On the other hand, the 
same deviation is not profitable in the original equilibrium, so that uj (a*, wj) ~ Uj (a*, wJ) . 
The implication is that condition 1 is satisfied. Since we assumed the contrary, no profitable 
deviation exists in subgames following (mi, m~, a). We are therefore assured that the strategy 
profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium for each subgame at the post-action stage. More in 
general, observe that whenever action profile a does not satisfy condition 1 with respect to 
another action profile a' then the set of subgame perfect equilibrium following (ml, a, ma) is 
identical to the set of equilibria following (ml' a', ma) . We will use repeatedly this observation 
later. 
Suppose next that a profitable deviation is available at the action stage. We show that in 
this case condition 2 must be satisfied, generating a contradiction. The existence of a profitable 
deviation implies that there exists an agent i, an action ai f= ai and a message m~ such that the 
agent is better off taking the action ai, issuing the message m~ and then obtaining the resulting 
compensation scheme. Following a deviation ai, the observed action profile is (ai, a-i). Let 
m2 = 0"2 (mi, (m~,m~-i), (ai, a-i)) and wY = 9 (mi, (m~,m~~i) ,m2)' Then the profitability 
of the deviation implies: 
ui ((ai, a-i) ,wf) > Ui (a, w;) 
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that is, part 1 of condition 2 is satisfied. To see that part 2 is also satisfied, suppose that there 
exists an action ai such that (ai, a~i) does not satisfy condition 1 with respect to (ai, a-i). 
The implication is that the set of subgame perfect equilibria following a given set of messages 
(ml' ma) must be the same. Now recall that wf has been taken to be the worst subgame 
perfect equilibrium outcome for agent i. If Ui ((ai, a~i) ,wY) > Ui (a* , wi) then agent i has a 
profitable deviation in the right equilibrium, namely take action ai and issue message m~ at 
the message stage. We conclude that for every action ai, either Ui ((ai, a~i) , wf) ~ Ui (a*, wi) 
or (ai,a~i) satisfies condition 1 with respect to (ai, a-i). 
At last, a profitable deviation may be available only at the pre-action stage. Again, we 
show that in this case condition 3 has to be satisfied, a contradiction. 
Let ml be the message resulting at the pre-action stage as a consequence of a profitable 
deviation by agent i (other agents may send messages other than in the right equilibrium 
because there may be substages at the pre-action stage, and agents may react to an out of 
equilibrium announcement). As a consequence of message ml the action profile a and the 
message profile ma results at the action stage, and the message m2 = (J2 (ml' ma, a) is issued 
at the post-action stage. These are the same action profiles and messages sent in the right 
equilibrium. Define wY = 9 (ml, ma, m'2) and observe that, since this is a profitable devia-
tion, we have Ui (a, wf) > Ui (a, wi) . Since the deviation is not profitable in the truthtelling 
equilibrium we have Ui (a, wf) ~ Ui (a*, wi). This implies that parts 1 and 2 of condition 
3 are satisfied. To show that part 3 is satisfied as well, consider an action profile a such 
that Ui (a, wf) ~ Ui (a, wi). Remember that (a, wf) was the worst subgame perfect equi-
librium outcome for agent i (the agent who first deviated at the pre-action stage). Since 
U i (a, wY) :s ui (a, wi) < Ui (a, wY), the following cannot be a subgame perfect equilibrium for 
the game starting at the action stage after message m'l : 
• At the action stage each agent takes action ai and issues message m~ . 
• After the action stage, if (a, m) is observed then follow strategy (J2 (ml, a, ma)' Otherwise 
follow the original strategy of the equilibrium yielding (a, wY). 
If a does not satisfy either condition 1 with respect to a or condition 2 with respect to (a, wY ) 
then this is in fact a subgame perfect equilibrium, a contradiction. The reasoning is analogous 
to the one used before. If a does not satisfies condition 1 with respect to a then no profitable 
deviation can exist at the post-action stage, as it would also be a profitable deviation in the 
original equilibrium. Thus, a profitable deviation must exist at the action stage. However, if 
a does not satisfy condition 2 with respect to (a, wY ) then any profitable deviation against a 
is also a profitable deviation against a. 
Part 4 of condition 3 is satisfied because a is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Observe 
that if (ai, a-i) does not satisfy condition 1 with respect to a then, following an identical set of 
messages, the same set of subgame perfect equilibria follows. Also recall that w; is the outcome 
of the worst possible subgame perfect equilibrium for agent i following a. This also implies that 
it is the worst possible subgame perfect equilibrium outcome when the action profile is (ai, a-i) , 
since the set of possible outcomes is the same. If u i ((ai, a-i) ,wf) > u i Ca, wf) than agent i 
has a profitable deviation against the equilibrium yielding (a, wY), a contradiction. • 
11 
Proof of theorem 2 
The proof is divided into two lemmas. Lemma 1 shows that there is a subgame perfect equi-
librium with outcome (a*,w*). Lemma 2 shows that there is no subgame perfect equilibrium 
with outcome other than (a*, w*) . 
Lemma 1 There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium with outcome (a*, w*) . 
Proof. We show that the following strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium yielding 
(a*, w*). 
PRE-ACTION STAGE: Each agent announces (a*, 0) . 
ACTION STAGE: When the standing message is (a, iiJ) each agent i takes action ai and an-
nounces (a,O). 
POST-ACTION STAGE: If a is the true action profile observed then announce (a,O). If a game 
r (a, a) is reached then announce (Y,O) if agent j weakly prefers wj to wJ. Otherwise announce 
(N,O). 
We now check, working backward, that this is a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
At r (a, a) the only agent who can change the outcome is j. It is clear that the prescribed 
strategy is optimal. 
At the post-action stage an agent i can deviate announcing a false action profile a that 
satisfies condition 1 with respect to the action profile and such that j (a, a) i- i. Since the other 
agents are announcing the true action profile, the equilibrium at r (a, a) is that everybody 
announces (Y, 0), making the deviant agent worse off. 
Consider now the action stage. Suppose first that the standing message is (a*, w*). Taking 
an action ai i- ai and announcing (a*,·) is clearly not profitable since, given the equilibrium 
at the post-action stage, it yields at most -E, Taking action ai and issuing message (a,,), 
yielding as standing message (a, wY ) is not profitable either. This yields at most -E if (ai, a:'i ) 
satisfies condition 1 with respect to a, and a utility inferior to Ui (a*, w*) otherwise (this is a 
consequence of part 2 of condition 2). 
If the standing message is (a, wY) then the same reasoning applies. If ai i- ai is taken and 
(a,·) is announced then the agent obtains at most -E if (ai,a-i) satisfies condition 1 with 
respect to a. If the condition is not satisfied, then by part 4 of condition 3 the agent is not 
better off. 
At last, no deviation at the pre-action stage is profitable, by part 2 of condition 3. • 
Lemma 2 There is no subgame perfect equilibrium with an outcome other than (a, w*) . 
Proof. All equilibria must have the following structure: 
• All agents announce (a*, 0) at "the pre-action stage . 
• If (a, w) is the standing message at the action stage then all agents announce (a, 0) . 
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• When the action profile is a has been taken then all agents announce unanimously an 
action profile a at the post action stage such that a does not satisfy condition 1 with 
respect to a. 
• Whenever a given message is issued with positive probability at the action stage, it is 
confirmed at the post-action stage. If not, the integer game would be triggered at the 
action stage. 
• If a substage r (a, a) is reached and agent j (a, a) strictly prefers w; (a, a) to wj (a, a) 
then the only equilibrium is that all agents announce (N,O). 
The implication is that in all equilibria the action stage is reached with probability 1 with 
standing message (a*, w*), the announcement is confirmed at the action stage ans then again 
at the post action stage. We have only to show that, when this sequence of messages occurs, 
no action profile a =1= a* can be part of an equilibrium. 
Suppose that there is an equilibrium in which at the action stage the agents take an action 
profile a =1= a*. It can never be the case t hat action a satisfies condition 1 with respect to a*. 
The reason is that at the post action st age one agent could announce the true action profile, 
thus reaching r (a, a) and obtaining K. 
If a satisfies condition 2 then agent i identified by the condition has a profitable deviation, 
namely take action ai and announce (a,·). This implies that the standing message becomes 
((ai, a-i) , (wf, W~i))' After such a message profile, the only equilibria at the post-action stage 
are that all agents announce an action profile (a,O) which does not satisfy condition 1 with 
respect to (ai, a-i), so that wf is implemented and agent i is better off. 
At last, suppose a satisfies condition 3. In this case the agent i identified by Condition 3 
can profitably deviate at the pre-action stage announcing (a, 0). Following such an announce-
ment, in all subgame perfect equilibria following it must be the case that all agents announce 
unanimously (0,,0) at the action stage and confirm the message at the post-action stage, so that 
wY is actually implemented. It remain to show that the action profile a taken in equilibrium is 
Sllch that Ui (a, wY ) > ui (a, w*) . Suppose not, so that Ui (a, wY ) ::; ui (a, w*). Then, part 3 of 
condition 3 tells us that a either satisfies condition 1 with respect to a or it satisfies condition 
2 with respect to (a, wY ) • In the first case, an unanimous announcement of (0,,0) cannot be an 
equilibrium at the post-action stage. In the second case, it is immediate to see that there is 
an agent with a profitable deviation at the action stage. • 
References 
[1] Abreu, D. and A. Sen (1990) 'Subgame Perfect Implementation: A Necessary and Almost 
Sufficient Condition', Journal of Economic Theory, 50: 285-299. 
[2] Abreu, D. and H. Matsushima (1992) 'Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated 
Strategies: Complete Information', Econometrica, 60: 993-1008. 
13 
[3] Arya, A. and J. Glover (1997) 'A Simple Forecasting Mechanism for Moral Hazard Set-
tings', Journal of Economic Theory, 66: 507-521. 
[4] Arya, A., J. Glover and J. Hughes (1997) 'Implementing Coordinated Team Play', Journal 
of Economic Theory, 74: 218-232. 
[5] Brusco S. (1977) 'Implementing Action Profiles with Sequential Mechanism', mimeo, Uni-
versidad Carlos In de Madrid. 
[6] Demski, J. and D. Sappington (1984) 'Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents', 
Journal of Economic Theory, 33: 152-171. 
[7] Dutta, B. and A. Sen (1991) 'A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two Person Nash 
Implementation', Journal of Economic Theory, 50: 285-299. 
[8] Ma, C. (1988) 'Unique Implementation ofIncentive Contracts with Many Agents', Review 
of Economic Studies, 55: 555-572. 
[9] Ma, C. , J. Moore and S. Thrnbull (1988) 'Stopping Agents from Cheating', Journal of 
Economi,c Theory, 46: 355-372. 
[10] Mookherjee, D. (1984) 'Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents', Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 51: 433-446. 
[11] Moore, J. and R. Repullo (1988) 'Subgame Perfect Implementation', Econometrica, 56: 
1191-1220. 
[12] Moore, J. and R. Repullo (1990) 'Na.<;h Implementation: A Full Characterization', Econo-
metrica, 58: 1083-1099. 
[13] Selten, R. (1975) 'Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in 
Extensive Games', International Journal of Game Theory, 9: 1-12. 
[14] Sji::istri::im, T, (1996) 'Implementation and Information in Teams', Economic Design, 1: 
327-341. 
14 
